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THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Hans Kelsen. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Inc., 1950. Published under the auspices of The London
Institute of World Affairs. Pp. xvii, 903. 818.75.
IN accordance with his "pure theory of law", Professor Hans Kelsen has
presented in this 900 page treatise a "juristic-not a political-approach to
the problems of the United Nations." The task of a scientific commentary
such as this, according to the author, is to find by analysis all the possible
interpretations of the legal norms (i.e. the provisions of the United Nations
Charter); and then to reveal their consequences, leaving it to the law-apply-
ing organs to choose from the various possible interpretations the one which
they for political reasons consider to be preferable and which they alone are
entitled to select (p. xvi). The view that it is the function of interpretation
to find the 'true meaning' of law is for Kelsen a fiction, adopted to maintain
the illusion of legal security. The legal function of interpretation is, rather,
to render binding one of the several meanings of a legal rule, all of which are
logically possible. Consequently, authentic interpretation can only be
performed by those who are authorized by the law to do so. Interpretation
by a person not authorized is legally irrelevant; hence the scientific commen-
tator should present all interpretations, including even those which are in
his opinion undesirable. It is on the basis of these principles that the author
claims to have separated law from politics in this "critical analysis" of the
United Nations Charter.
There is an element of irony in the fact that this non-political study was
thrust almost immediately after publication into the political arena of the
United Nations. It was Mr. Vyshinsky, I think, who first commended it
to the attention of the General Assembly; but western representatives were
not far behind in finding passages to support their views. I No doubt there
will be many more citations, for there is a number of reasons why this book
is bound to appeal to delegates as a source of quotation. One such reason
obviously is the international reputation of its author, particularly his
prestige in European and Latin American countries. Another is the com-
prehensive and systematic character of the book, which covers almost all of
the basic legal problems presented by the Charter.
More important, perhaps, is the fact that delegates-and other readers-
are likely to be impressed with the fundamental approach of the book: its
close analysis of the structure of rules and their inter-relationships; the
eschewing of political and ideological considerations; the emphasis on legal
duties rather than purposes and functions; the awareness of the creative
role played by the law-applying organs. These guiding principles (which
are derived from, though not logically dependent on, Kelsen's pure theory)
1. See Summary Records of 362d, 363rd and 364th meetings of First Committee of
General Assembly (October 13 and 16, 1950).
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are welcome elements in a study of this kind; they promise objectivity,
toughmindedness and technical skill, attributes which in a legal treatise will
command more respect than idealism or imagination.
For these reasons, the book may exert a significant influence on develop-
ments in the United Nations. A reviewer is, therefore, under a special ob-
ligation to examine it critically; to see, first, whether the book does, in fact,
live up to the principles it preaches; and secondly, to consider the impli-
cations of the approach taken.
The first question is whether Kelsen does present, as he claims to do, "all
possible interpretations" (p. xvi). Of course, he does not; and it hardly
seems worthwhile to speculate on the special meaning he might give to
the word "possible". What is more to the point is that on a number of
questions Kelsen fails even to present the interpretations which have, in
fact, been advanced by member states and in some cases adopted by the
competent organs of the United Nations. Instead, Kelsen has presented as
"correct" his own interpretation, either ignoring the other views or merely
characterizing them as doubtful. To demonstrate this fully would take far
more space than a book review permits; but it does not seem superfluous,
considering the reputation of the author, to give some specific examples.
I am tempted to begin with the following quotation: "At the moment the
League of Nations ceased to exist, not only its Covenant but also the Man-
date Agreements to which the League was a contracting Party-and its ex-
istence was an essential condition--ceased to be valid." (p. 598). As far as I
can see, no other "possible" interpretation is presented by Kelsen. But the
interesting fact is that the International Court of Justice, the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, has expressed precisely the opposite
opinion: it concluded in the recent South West African case that the in-
ternational Mandate applicable to that territory has continued in force
despite the dissolution of the League.2 Even more striking is that the Court's
opinion was unanimous with respect to this point, a rare occurrence for
fifteen judges representing diverse legal systems. It is true that this advisory
opinion would have been mentioned by Kelsen had it been rendered prior
to the writing of this book; but this only underlines the fact that Kelsen
could present as his unqualified interpretation a position which was sub-
sequently unanimously rejected by the Court and, for that matter, previ-
ously rejected by a considerable number of Governments in the United
Nations and at the last session of the League of Nations. 3
Another example which warrants mention is Kelsen's conclusion that
the United Nations has legally only the power to enter into those inter-
national agreements which it is authorized by specific provisions of the
2 I.C.J. REPORTS 128 (1950).
3. See statements by United Kingdom, Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand
(all mandatory Powers) in LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL, Spec. Supp. No. 194
(1946). See also Res. 181 (II) of the General Assembly of the U.N. (1947) making a recom-
mendation to the U.K. as the mandatory Power for Palestine.
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Charter to conclude (p. 330). This opinion is presented without discussion
of any other possible interpretation, although the General Assembly of the
United Nations, which is surely a competent organ for this purpose, has
concluded a half dozen important agreements which are not specifically
authorized by the Charter. Nor does Kelsen mention in this connection the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in April 1949 with
respect to reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United
Nations, perhaps because it too came too late for the book. Nevertheless,
it is pertinent to note that in this opinion the Court stated that "Under
international law the Organization must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties." 4
It was noted by the Court that this "principle of law" was also applied by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in an advisory opinion concerning
the ILO given in 1926. It would have been interesting to have Kelsen con-
sider this principle rather than to have assumed that the Organization
necessarily had only those special capacities conferred upon it by particular
provisions.
On many other questions Kelsen manifests the same tendency to give the
Charter a more restrictive interpretation than that adopted by the com-
petent organs. Even in the case of the Security Council, whose broad re-
sponsibilities and powers are recognized by Kelsen, he is inclined to adopt a
narrower interpretation than the Council or Member Governments. Thus,
he states flatly (on page 284) that it is "impossible" to interpret Article 24
(which is the basic article setting forth the Council's responsibility to main-
tain peace and security) so as to confer upon the Council powers not specif-
ically given to it by other articles of the Charter. However, the Security
Council itself (Australia alone dissenting) adopted this "impossible" in-
terpretation when it assumed the responsibilities conferred on it in regard
to Trieste by the Peace Treaty with Italy.
Another instance in his suggestion that the Security Council is not allowed
to consider disputes under chapter VI (which relates to peaceful settlement)
if in the opinion of one of the contesting parties the dispute is essentially
within its domestic jurisdiction, even though there may be no doubt that
the dispute may endanger international peace (pp. 788, 789). Although
Kelsen cites statements by the Netherlands and British delegations in
support of this view, he does not in this connection point out that the major-
ity of the Council rejected this position in both the Indonesian and Spanish
cases. 5 In the light of the record, there is little reason to believe that the
Council would regard the domestic jurisdiction clause as applicable to a
dispute or situation deemed likely to endanger international peace.
4. See I.C.J. REPORTS 182 (1949).
5. See, for example, REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON SPANISH QUESTION, U.N. Doc.
S/75, p. 14 (1946).
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As might be expected, Kelsen's rigid analysis leaves little room for meas-
ures against aggression taken in the Korean case and included in the Acheson
proposals recently adopted by the General Assembly. To Kelsen "effective
collective measures" can only mean enforcement action taken by the Council
under Articles 41, 42, 43 of the Charter (pp. 204, 281). In fact, in the Korean
case the Council provided for the use of armed force merely by means of a
"recommendation" under Article 39, which was certainly an effective meas-
ure in that case, although it presumably would not have been considered
proper by Kelsen (p. 734). In adopting the Acheson proposals, the General
Assembly decided that it may make recommendations for collective meas-
ures, including the use of armed force. As noted by Vyshinsky in the debate
on this resolution, Kelsen's analysis of the term "action" as used in Article
11 (2) suggests that such recommendations may not properly be made by the
General Assembly but must be referred to the Security Council (p. 205).
The General Assembly itself, by a large majority, has implicitly rejected
this narrow interpretation of its competence.
It is also not surprising in the light of the examples just given, that on
somewhat more controversial issues Kelsen consistently adopts what might
be called the "principle of ineffectiveness" of the Charter. Thus, he con-
siders the many references to human rights as essentially the expression of
pious hopes, devoid of legal obligation (p. 29); and he rejects the pertinent
"pledge" in Article 56 (considered important in San Francisco) as legally
"meaningless and redundant" (p. 100). Admittedly, these are debatable
questions and Kelsen's analysis has considerable force. But here again, it
must be noted that Kelsen's practice varies from his principles, for he does
not really present the other possible interpretations, although such other
interpretations may easily be found in the records of the General Assembly
debates on various human rights resolutions.6
It might perhaps be said in reply to this point that the fact that Govern-
ments and U.N. organs have taken certain positions shows only that such
interpretations are politically or psychologically "possible", not that they
are logically possible; and that Kelsen is, ex hypothesi, concerned only with
logical criteria, not with a description of actual behavior. It is of course
true that the validity of a purely logical analysis, like that of pure mathemat-
ics, is independent of actual cases; but the examples cited above (and many
other similar cases could be cited) have more than a factual significance.
They reveal, it seems to me, the logical (as well as the empirical) weaknesses
of Kelsen's analysis. For there is nothing in the "laws of logic" to warrant
Kelsen's rejection of these other interpretations; indeed, in some cases, his
narrow interpretation may be attributed to a failure to use logical analysis.
6. Kelsen quotes the resolutions on Indians in South Africa (1946) and Russian wives
(1948) but does not present the statements of delegates which in support of these resolutions
give interpretations which are at variance with his conclusions. In general, the most im-
pressive answer to Kelsen on these human rights questions can be found in Prof. Lauter-
pacht's valuable study on INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RiGHTS (1950).
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Thus, when he says the Organization may only make agreements which
are specifically authorized (supra), he fails to consider (as a logician would
and as the International Court did) the "necessary implications" to be
drawn from the specific powers. After all, it is a primary function of logical
analysis to deduce consequences from postulates and thereby to broaden
the scope of principles and widen the range of possibilities.
Kelsen's apparent use of "logic" to support restrictive interpretation re-
sults largely from his tendency to give the concepts of the Charter fixed
and limited meanings, almost as though they were precisely defined math-
ematical symbols. Obviously this tendency makes it easier to find logical
inconsistencies and technical deficiencies. But there are certainly no
"logical" reasons why the admittedly vague and imprecise language of the
Charter must be restricted in meaning. The Charter is surely not to be
construed like a lease of land or an insurance policy; it is a constitutional
instrument whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing circum-
stances for an undefined future. Any doubt as to the flexibility and adapt-
ability of the Charter must surely have been resolved by recent develop-
ments.
These observations seem so close to truisms that one is inclined to wonder
whether Kelsen's neglect of them is not due to his own bias-or, to put it
another way, whether his "purely juristic" analysis has not actually been
influenced by ideological (or shall we say, crypto-political) considerations.
For throughout the book there seems to be so sustained an effort to discover
the maximum of inconsistency-even absurdity-in the Charter, to char-
acterize provisions as "superfluous" and "meaningless", to cast doubt on the
legal basis of even the most innocuous decisions of U.N. organs 7 that one
is apt to infer that Kelsen's underlying objective is a revision of the Charter
(see p. xvii) and a building of a new Organization closer to his own heart's
desire. This is not the place to debate the political wisdom of tearing down
to build anew; but it might be said that in the present state of affairs, many
of us are grateful that we have at least an imperfect instrument for world
order and, more important, that this instrument is being construed not in
terms of its deficiencies but in order to make effective its principles and
purposes.
OSCAR SCHACHTER*
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING. By Edward H. Levi. Chicago':
University of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 74. $2.00.
ALTHOUGH he begins with a statement as to the "pretense" of law, Dr.
Levi's book is much more temperate than most of what has been said of the
7. There is even the suggestion that the General Assembly had no legal basis for adopt-
ing a U.N. flag or declaring "United Nations Day"! (p. 194, footnote 5).
* Deputy Director, United Nations Legal Department.
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